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Maryland Surface Waters - A Critical Analysis'
Kennedy-Chamberlin Development Co. v. Snure2
Surface waters from the defendant's land drained na-
turally into a small stream, flowed southerly through an
existing pipe under Goldsboro Road, and emptied into a
ditch which wound through the plaintiffs' property. The
defendant municipality planned to construct two new roads
on its land; and the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
against proposed changes in the drainage system by which
the defendant would install storm drains along these new
roads emptying into the Goldsboro Road pipe which in
turn would be replaced with a larger tile. Despite asser-
tions, through expert witnesses, that the proposed increase
in the flow of water onto plaintiffs' lands would cause
erosion, flooding, and damage, the plaintiffs were denied
relief below. The question on appeal was whether or not
the lower court erred in refusing relief when no damage
had in fact been proven, even though a prospective increase
in the flow of water was conceded. The question was
answered in the negative and the decision was, on appeal,
affirmed. The Court held that the evidence of alleged
future damage was not sufficiently clear and convincing to
constitute a basis for equitable relief by injunction.
The decision is noteworthy in that, first, it purports to
apply the civil law test' in dealing with surface waters and,
second, in so doing it raises the question as to what extent
dominant or upper landowners may improve or modify
their lands in Maryland when the changes may incidentally
result in injury to the lower land due to an increase in the
flow of water. What has become known as the civil law
1 This case note is intended as a supplement to a former Note, Drainage
Of Surface Waters Under The Civil Law Rule As Applied In Maryland,
11 Md. L. Rev. 58 (1950).
2 212 Md. 369, 129 A. 2d 142 (1957).
8 This rule is expressive of the common law maxim of water-courses:
"Aqua eurrit et debet currere, at currere solcbat" - "Water runs, and
ought to run, as It has used to run." 11 Md. L. Rev. 58, 61 (1950) ; Goble v.
Louisville & N. R. Oo., 187 Ga. 243, 200 S. E. 259, 261 (1938). The support-
ing theory Is that higher ground Is preferable, more expensive, and is pur-
chased with an understanding that the water will continue to descend in
its natural manner. This rule is not, however, dependent upon the law of
easements, but assumes the form of a natural right to the continued flow of
surface waters. Since this right is advantageous to agricultural areas, and
the United States at Its Inception and during Its formative years was pre-
dominantly agricultural, the rule has found widespread acceptance. Shahan
v. Brown, 179 Ala. 425, 60 So. 891 (1913) ; Meixell v. Morgan, 149 Pa. St.
415, 24 A. 216 (1892) ; Bradbury v. Vandalia Levee & Drainage Dist., 236
Ill. 36, 86 N. E. 163 (1908).
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rule,4 recognizing a natural easement of drainage from
higher land onto lower lands, was adopted and explained
by the Court of Appeals in 1887 as follows:
"The prevailing doctrine in this country seems to be
that the owner of the upper land has a right to the un-
interrupted flowage of the water.., and that the pro-
prietor of the lower land, . . . , has no right to make
embankments whereby the current may be arrested
and accumulated on the property of his neighbor. This
is the rule of the civil law, . ..
However, in subsequent cases, 6 the Court altered the
effect of this rule by liberalizing its application, particu-
larly where a strict application would result in great hard-
ship to one or both of the parties. This was accomplished
by applying a "reasonableness of use" test instead of the
aforementioned civil law rule.7 The Court, however, in
Whitman v. Forney, was rather reluctant to go as far as to
say that they were breaking precedent and adopting the
reasonable use rule. To avoid such a result, the Court, in
referring to its use of the reasonableness of use rule, stated:
"It creates no precedent, does not change the adopted
rule of law, but provides mitigation for the harsh appli-
cation of either of the rules, which might be applied in
the particular State in which the case arises."'
'The other principal rule, in contraposition to the civil law rule, is the
so-called common law rule which is also known as the "common enemy"
doctrine. Popular in large urban areas, particularly from New Jersey to
New England, this rule is based upon the belief that surface waters are a
detriment and thus can be warded off with impunity by all landowners.
See 11 Md. L. Rev., ibid, 61-62; 56 Am. Jun. 552, Water, §69; Chadeayne v.
Robinson, 55 Conn. 345, 11 A. 592 (1887) ; Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N. Y. 140
(1881) ; Boyd v. Conklin, 54 Mich. 583, 20 N. W. 595 (1884).
5P., W. & B. R.R. Co. v. Davis, 68 Md. 281, 289, 11 A. 822 (1888).
'Whitman v. Forney, 181 Md. 652, 31 A. 2d 630 (1943); Battisto v.
Perkins, 210 Md. 542, 124 A. 2d 288 (1956). See also: Bishop v. Richard,
193 Md. 6, 65 A. 2d 334 (1949) ; Biberman v. Funkhouser, 190 Md. 424, 58
A. 2d 668 (1948), both noted 11 Md. L. Rev. 58 (1950).
'This Is the third rule in effect in the United States. Under It, surface
waters may be interfered with so long as the respective landowners are
utilizing their lands reasonably in so doing, as compared to the damage
caused by 'the interference. Minnesota and New Hampshire have adopted
this doctrine. See Note, Rule As To Surface Waters in Minnesota, 2 Minn.
L. Rev. 449 (1918) ; City of Franklin v. Durgee, 71 N. II. 186, 51 A. 911
(1901).
Flexibility seems to be lacking in the civil law rule. Under a strict
application of this rule, the lower owner would suffer a great hardship in
that he would be prevented from Improving his land or utilizing It in an
otherwise reasonable fashion. The desirable answer In each case is 'that all
attendant and extenuating circumstances be considered. "[T]he failure to
attain substantial justice by the enforcement in all cases of a rule of law
which does not recognize these important differences Is not surprising."
Franklin v. Durgee, ibid, 913.
8 Supra, n. 6, 659.
1958] KENNEDY, ETC., DEV. CO. V. SNURE 63
However, it is rather difficult to conceive how a Court can
apply a rule of law without adopting it. Furthermore, in
the subsequent case of Battisto v. Perkins, the Court in re-
ferring to the Whitman case, stated:
"In that case the Court also adopted and applied the
rule, known as 'reasonableness of use', involving a bal-
ance of benefit and harm."9
The result of these cases leaves Maryland in the rather
unique position of having adopted both the civil law rule
and the rule of reasonableness of use; the latter being
applied only in hardship situations. This, of course, intro-
duces some degree of uncertainty as to when the Court will
find the circumstances extenuating enough to call for the
application of the reasonableness of use rule.
It should be observed, however, that even prior to the
Whitman case, the Maryland Court has not been so dog-
matic as to adhere to a strict application of the civil law
rule."° The Maryland cases have always recognized two
limitations on this right of drainage under the civil law
rule. In Biberman v. Funkhouser,"1 the Court of Appeals
said:
... the upper owner has no right to increase
materially the quantity or volume of water discharged
on the lower landowner.., the upper owner has no
right to discharge water into an artificial channel or in
a different manner than the usual and ordinary natural
course of drainage, or put upon the lower land water
which would not have flowed there if the natural
drainage conditions had not been disturbed."' 2
For breach of the second limitation, the Court has approved
a self-help remedy in Hancock v. Stull" to the effect that
"[i] f water is unlawfully forced on the lower owner, he is
entitled to protect his property from the unwarranted
flow","4 and cited its acceptance in other Maryland cases."
In the instant case, the Court was on firm ground, from
the standpoint of precedent, in reciting these limitations on
the civil law rule. But the holding in this case did not apply
9 Supra, n. 6, 546.
"0The Whitman case, supra, n. 6, was the first case which expressly
applied a reasonable use test.
1 Supra, n. 6.
"Ibid, 429.
"206 Md. 117, 110 A. 2d 522 (1955).
Ibid, 119.
Supra, n. 6; City Dairy Co. v. Scott, 129 Md. 548, 100 A. 295 (1016)
[the protection here was by fill].
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such limitations to the defendant's natural right of drain-
age. The language of the Court was that:
".... at this time there is no specific evidence to
establish to what extent, if at all, the appellants' prop-
erty will be damaged,...
"The appellants' evidence . . . assumes conditions
which do not exist. Damage does not necessarily result
from an increased flow of surface water.
".... the evidence... (is) not conclusive as to the
legal rights of the parties hereto, ... "I'
In effect, damage and not merely an artificial increase or
concentration of the natural flow of surface water, is made
the test. Thus, even where the situation calls for the appli-
cation of the recognized limitations under the civil law
rule, the Court will not apply them if it does not deem it
reasonable to do so. In essence, is this not merely an appli-
cation of the reasonablness of use critterion? In other
words, under some circumstances the Court may deem it
reasonable to artificially increase or concentrate the natural
flow of surface water while in other situations it may not.
Can the Court's refusal to apply the civil law limitations
in the instant case be explained in view of its consistent
adherance to it in previous cases? Perhaps its departure
from established doctrine in the instant case can be justified
or distinguished by the defendant's status, it being that of a
municipality. The great majority of previous litigants on
this subject have been private landowners, 7 and the limita-
tions have been firmly applied with a rather rigid rein
being kept upon the dominant landowner."8 In the Kennedy
case, however, the dominant landowner is a municipality;
and although the Court warns of the line beyond which
even it cannot transgress, 19 it is interesting to note that the
Court says:
"The propriety, extent and character of public im-
provements which lie within the discretion of munici-
pal authorities are not subject to judicial interference
"6:Kennedy-Chamberlin Development Co. v. Snure, 212 Md. 369, 376-8, 129
A. 2d 142 (1957). Parenthetical material supplied.
17 Supra, ns. 5, 6, 15; Neubauer v. Overlea Realty Company, 142 Md. 87,
120 A. 69 (1923) ; Superior Construction Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 102 A. 2d
739, 104 A. 2d 581 (1954).
"8 See in particular Neubauer v. Overlea Realty Co., ibid, and Battisto v.
Perkins, 210 Md. 542, 124 A. 2d 288 (1956).
ID Supra, n. 16, 376:
"If, however, the municipality collects surface waters Into a single
channel and . , . causes the stream to overflow on his (the lower
owner's) lands, the owner has a cause of action."
(Parenthetical material supplied.)
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unless exercised arbitrarily, oppressively or fraudu-
lently, and they result in invasion of property rights."2
Similar language is to be found in the cases cited by the
Court in support of this position to the effect that the
dominant municipality will be liable only for unreasonable
methods of drainage, there being certainly no greater duty
of protection of the lower land imposed upon the munici-
pality than that required of a private owner.2' The reverse
implication, in fact, seems more tenable, that perhaps a
lesser duty and standard of conduct is required of the
municipality.
While the upper landowner is certainly not precluded
from improving his property, the Court of Appeals has
made it emphatic that there are prescribed boundaries of
standards within which he must operate. Dominant owners
of unimproved and wooded tracts can improve the land for
building, although they are under a legal obligation to use
precautions to prevent inundations of silt, mud, and debris
upon the servient land from the denuded slopes.22 How-
ever, no new artificial collection devices, channeling and
increasing the flow beyond the capacity of existing natural
and artificial channels, are permissible.2" In regrading, 4
the upper owner, on the authority of the Biberman2 5 case,
is given considerable latitude. Reasonable upgrading and
terracing is sanctioned in spite of slight increases both in
flow and direction of the surface waters with a balancing
of the cost to the lower owner to accommodate the increases
against the cost and damages to the upper owner of restor.
ing the premises to their original condition." However
these judicial holdings are not rules of proscription from
which a definite course of action may be outlined for the
home improver. Each case turns upon its own fact situa,
tion. In one case the character of the soil may account for
a marked erosion from an increased flow while in another
case the increase in flow may raise the water level substan-
tially without any visible erosion. However, the Court inti-
mates that "standing on one's rights" and acting "with im-
" Ibid, 378.
"See in particular Cech v. City of Cedar Rapids, 147 Iowa 247, 16 N. W.
166, 167 (1910).
Battisto v. Perkins, 8upra, n. 18, and Superior Construction Co. v. Elmo,
supra, n. 17.
2Baltimore County v. Hunter, 207 Md. 171, 113 A. 2d 910 (1955)
Neubauer v. Overlea Realty Co., 8upra, n. 17.
2 Regrading by either party does not change dominant to servient, nor
servient to dominant. The original, natural flowage of the surface water
determines this classification which remains unalterable by artificial means.
2Biberman v. Funkhouser, 190 Md. 424, 58 A. 2d 668 (1948).
-Ibid, 430.
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punity" are not compatible legal bedfellows, and that a liti-
gant claiming both will not be regarded in a favorable light.
The dominant owner who insists on increasing the flow in
furtherance of his improvement rights while flatly refusing
to reconsider any moderation of his plans can expect a strict
application of the limitations on his right of drainage simi-
lar to those applied in the Battisto"7 case.
The dominant owner may increase the flow, incident to
an improvement, until property rights of the servient
owner are infringed. The upper owner assumes the risk
of judicial wrath whenever he acts, but only in court can
he determine whether his actions rendered him liable.
Predictability in judicial decisions has an uncertain rating
in surface water cases. However, the civil law rule with
its limitations and the reasonable use rule, both of which
Maryland has adopted, are each in themselves, free from
any ambiguity. The lack of predictability here stems from
the uncertainty of not knowing in advance which rule the
Court will apply. This lack of certainty, however, may not
necessarily be undesirable. In fact, it may be asserted that
unpredictability is even good in that it tends to engender
a greater degree of equitable conduct on the part of the
parties. If the instant case is really a departure from the
usual limitations under the civil law rule as based upon
the reasons outlined therein, still the application was made
in a case where a municipality was the dominant land-
owner, and the broad configurations of the civil law rule's
limitations in use in Maryland will probably remain un-
changed for private dominant landowners in surface water
cases.
LERoY HANDWERGER
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Property Tax Assessments - Invalid Discrimination
Between Real And Personal Property Valuation
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. State Tax Commission1
The taxpayer, Sears, maintains a number of retail estab-
lishments throughout the State of Maryland. It appealed
from an assessment of its tangible personal property, levied
21 Supra, n. 18. In that case, plaintiff sued for damages caused by pre-
cipitations of mud and debris through increased flow of rain water from
defendants' higher land as an alleged result of regrading and building
activities. Defendants refused to afford the plaintiffs more than token
protection from such inundations. The Court awarded the plaintiffs dam-
ages equal to the cost of restoration of the premises.
'214 Md. 550, 136 A. 2d 567 (Md., 1957).
